Here is the final report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission into the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Two thorough Dissenting Statements accompany the final report. The report is a chronological compendium of the review of millions of pages of documents, the interviews of hundreds of leaders, CxOs, financial experts and academics, as well as common people, home- and business-owners who were also significantly affected by the financial meltdown. - Summary by Mario Pineda
Chapters
1 Preface 8 min 2 Conclusions of the Commission 38 min 3 Conclusions of the Commission, concluded 23 min 4 Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 1 38 min 5 Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 2 46 min 6 Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 3 18 min 7 Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and Repos 30 min 8 Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan Crisis 18 min 9 Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 20 min 10 Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured Finance 12 min 11 Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of Derivatives 26 min 12 Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking Activities 19 min 13 Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital Management 12 min 14 Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com Crash 12 min 15 Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of Finance 13 min 16 Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector Growth 9 min 17 Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage Securitization 17 min 18 Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to Lending 6 min 19 Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in Turmoil 6 min 20 Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The Regulators 19 min 21 Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing Force 20 min 22 Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A Premium 18 min 23 Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory Scrutiny 5 min 24 Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lending 13 min 25 Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing Position 4 min 26 Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our Intention" 11 min 27 Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage" 6 min 28 Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6 1 min 29 Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit Opportunity 10 min 30 Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good Loan 33 min 31 Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws is a Significant Benefit 7 min 32 Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product 17 min 33 Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank Check 16 min 34 Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in the Marketplace 13 min 35 Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7 3 min 36 Ch. 8. The CDO Machine 8 min 37 Ch. 8. We Created the Investor 22 min 38 Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just Didn't Function 11 min 39 Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of Interest 11 min 40 Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire Street 10 min 41 Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime 17 min 42 Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some Alchemy 19 min 43 Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess 19 min 44 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8 3 min 45 Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom" 15 min 46 Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environments 23 min 47 Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the Factory 24 min 48 Regulators: markets will always self-correct 15 min 49 Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and Dance 11 min 50 Lehman: From Moving to Storage 8 min 51 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark Choices 12 min 52 2006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the credit pool 12 min 53 Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the goals 17 min 54 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9 2 min 55 Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager" 10 min 56 Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question" 24 min 57 Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless" 18 min 58 AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks" 9 min 59 Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes" 12 min 60 Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?" 7 min 61 Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue" 24 min 62 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10 2 min 63 Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market" 30 min 64 Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before" 8 min 65 Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending" 5 min 66 Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information" 10 min 67 Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?" 13 min 68 Commission Conclusions on Ch. 11 3 min 69 Early 2007: Spreading Subprime Worries 7 min 70 Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be Aggressive 14 min 71 Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds 16 min 72 Rating Agencies 4 min 73 AIG: Well Bigger 8 min 74 Commission Conclusions on Ch. 12 1 min 75 Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding Intro 2 min 76 Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors" 6 min 77 Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11" 8 min 78 Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells" 5 min 79 Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm" 4 min 80 Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose" 6 min 81 Commission conclusions on Chapter 13 2 min 82 Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro) 3 min 83 Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer" 12 min 84 Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention" 22 min 85 Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses" 32 min 86 Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working" 8 min 87 Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses" 9 min 88 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14 1 min 89 Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro) 4 min 90 Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance" 4 min 91 Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical" 4 min 92 Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral" 9 min 93 Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors" 11 min 94 Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number" 5 min 95 Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole" 3 min 96 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15 1 min 97 Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro) 3 min 98 Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared" 9 min 99 Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable" 5 min 100 Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position" 8 min 101 Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk" 7 min 102 Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey" 27 min 103 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16 1 min 104 Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro) 3 min 105 Ch 17 "A good time to buy" 5 min 106 Ch 17 "The only game in town" 4 min 107 Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool" 7 min 108 Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse" 4 min 109 Ch 17 "It will increase confidence" 9 min 110 Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices" 6 min 111 Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between" 8 min 112 Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution" 4 min 113 Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade" 1 min 114 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17 2 min 115 Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro) 5 min 116 Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded" 7 min 117 Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all" 4 min 118 Ch 18 "Spook the market" 11 min 119 Ch 18 "Imagination hat" 8 min 120 Ch 18 "Heads of family" 4 min 121 Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind" 3 min 122 Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty" 8 min 123 Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail" 4 min 124 Ch 18 "A calamity" 13 min 125 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18 2 min 126 Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro) 5 min 127 Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious" 7 min 128 Ch 19 "Spillover effect" 11 min 129 Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant" 5 min 130 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19 3 min 131 Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro) 8 min 132 Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones" 11 min 133 Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line" 13 min 134 Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt" 6 min 135 Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours" 4 min 136 Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell" 18 min 137 Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach" 18 min 138 Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient" 10 min 139 Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman" 11 min 140 Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding" 13 min 141 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20 3 min 142 Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro) 4 min 143 Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping" 12 min 144 Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts" 10 min 145 Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving" 5 min 146 Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls" 8 min 147 Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier" 3 min 148 Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery" 7 min 149 Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard" 7 min 150 Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios" 6 min 151 Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving" 5 min 152 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22 1 min 153 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro 1 min 154 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our approach differs from others? 7 min 155 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of the crisis 2 min 156 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten essential causes of the financial and economic crisis 6 min 157 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit bubble: global capita flows, underpriced risk, and Federal Reserve policy 8 min 158 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housing bubble 9 min 159 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning bad mortgages into toxic financial assets 7 min 160 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank bets and why banks failed 10 min 161 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types of systemic failure 14 min 162 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock and panic 7 min 163 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system freezing 4 min 164 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro 24 min 165 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary 8 min 166 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government policies resulted in an unprecedented number of risky mortgages 16 min 167 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housing bubble and its effects 13 min 168 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgages 4 min 169 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and growth of subprime PMBS 8 min 170 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known about NTMs prior to the crisis? 17 min 171 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. Conclusion 5 min 172 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - Intro 3 min 173 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - How failures among NTMs were transmitted to the financial system 3 min 174 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - The defaults begin 34 min 175 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - Intro 9 min 176 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 1. HUD's central role 8 min 177 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 2. The decline of mortgage underwriting standards 36 min 178 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 1 28 min 179 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 2 29 min 180 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 4. Competition between the GSEs and FHA for subprime and alt-a mortgages 10 min 181 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 5. Enlisting mortgage bankers and subprime lenders in affordable housing 5 min 182 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 6. The community reinvestment act 22 min 183 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. Conclusion 3 min
